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Sex, lies and public money: Recent scandals in Britain and Italy. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the early 1990s in many democracies there have been growing levels of public 
concern about the standards of conduct of public office-holders. Such concern can be 
seen, in the UK case, in terms of survey data (showing, for example, a decline in 
Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index score from from 8.6 in 1995 to 
7.7 in 2008); the growth in the volume of legislation concerning standards that has 
characterised the period since the setting up of the Committee on Standards in 1994, and 
the growing attention of the mass media to issues of corruption and integrity (as revealed 
by the number of newspaper headlines containing words such as ‘corrupt’ and ‘bribe’ and 
their derivations, ‘corruption’, ‘corrupting’, ‘corrupted’, ‘bribery’, ‘bribed’ etc.). That 
such growing concerns are by no means confined to the UK is revealed when one 
examines for the presence of such terms the headlines of foreign newspapers (Figures 1 
and 2).  
 
 In looking for explanations for these growing concerns, one is immediately struck 
by the number of high-profile scandals – including Tangentopoli in Italy; the various 
allegations of ‘sleaze’ that played a prominent role in the downfall of the Conservatives 
in Britain; the party finance scandal that led to the disgrace of Helmut Kohl in Germany; 
the resignation, in 1999, of the entire EU Commission in the wake of publication of 
evidence of fraud, corruption and mismanagement at senior levels – that seem to have 
marked the period since the beginning of the 1990s. That there really has been an 
increase in the incidence of scandals of this kind is suggested by the nature of politics in 
democratic countries in the post-Cold War world. This is a world in which absence of the 
once deep-seated ideological conflicts between left and right (which the power struggle 
between the US and the USSR at the level of international politics had served to 
underpin) have everywhere made policy differences between mainstream parties harder 
to identify than in the past. Consequently, the terrain of political conflict has to a degree 
shifted from that of policy to that of morality with parties increasingly attempting to 
compete with each other by throwing mud and attempting to damage each other by 
fomenting scandal, as the Lewinsky affair in America showed so forcefully – a 
phenomenon that Ginsberg and Shefter (2002) have called ‘politics by other means’. It is 
a world in which media developments have rendered the lives of the individuals who 
walk on the public stage ‘much more visible than they ever were in the past’ (Thompson, 
2000: 6). If this has enabled politicians to compete by presenting themselves not just as 
leaders, but as human beings and therefore as ‘one of us’, then by encouraging their 
audiences increasingly to assess them in terms of their character as individuals 
(Thompson, 2000: 39-41) it has rendered them more vulnerable to the above-mentioned 
drives in the direction of politics by other means. 
 
 Scandals of this kind can have a number of significant consequences. They may 
damage or even bring about the downfall of those touched by them; they may produce 
moral panics; they may change public values; they may be the catalysts of significant 
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social change. These consequences are in no sense inevitable, however. Politicians, in 
Britain at least, if caught with half-masted trousers, have, as Garrard (2006: 18) points 
out, ‘as much scandalous potential as they did in the nineteenth century’. Yet when in 
1992, the Leader of the Liberal Democrats was obliged to admit that he had had an affair 
with his then secretary Patricia Howard, screaming tabloid headlines did nothing to 
prevent his personal popularity rising, after he had made his public statement, from 34 to 
47 percent according to polls, while his party moved ahead from 13 to 15 percent 
(Sarasota Herald Tribune, 1992). One of the most significant consequences of the cash-
for-questions and other scandals in Britain in the early 1990s has been a significant 
narrowing of the boundaries of permissible conduct for those in positions of public trust, 
both as a result of the enactment of codes of conduct and, as a consequence, through a 
tightening of the limits of public tolerance. On the other hand, though the presence of 
widespread corruption in the political and administrative system became a major political 
issue in Italy in the early 1990s, a few years later the question faded from the political 
agenda; anti-corruption policies have been few, social sanctions against those alleged to 
be involved in corruption rather mild – ‘as epitomised by the case of Prime Minister 
Berlusconi who, as centre-right leader, won the elections of 2001 and 2008 despite being 
under investigation in several corruption cases and inquiries’ (Vannucci, 2009: 235). 
 
 But while we know that the consequences of scandals are neither uniform nor 
inevitable, we know very little about how and why their impacts vary. Presumably, 
answers to these questions are to be found by looking both at the nature of specific 
scandals and at the characteristics of the political and social contexts in which they take 
place. With this in mind, we propose in the remaining paragraphs to examine in some 
detail the scandal surrounding MPs’ expenses in the UK and the recent allegations 
concerning the conduct of Silvio Berlusconi in the area of personal morality in Italy. By 
comparing the two, we ought to be able to develop some suggestions about the conditions 
under which scandals have the effects that they sometimes do have. Of course, these 
affairs are very different in many respects. What they have in common is that they have 
ultimately been driven by the perception that the alleged wrong-doing has cheapened the 
democratic process, resulting in more or less significant losses of authority for the 
political actors involved. Yet despite these commonalities, the consequences of the two 
rows, in terms of voting behaviour and parties’ electoral fortunes have so far been rather 
different. Why is this?  
 
 It is only worth asking this question if we are satisfied that the two affairs are 
comparable and that, against what actually happened, the assumption of a negative 
impact in both cases was prima facie at least a reasonable expectation. These issues are 
dealt with in the second and third sections respectively. In the fourth section it is 
suggested that the different impact of the two is to be explained in terms of the content 
and distribution of public attitudes and the power of those at the centre of the affairs to 
change attitudes and use them to defend themselves. We attempt, in the final section to 
use this discussion to draw some conclusions about the distinctiveness of Britain and 
Italy as liberal democracies and thus the conditions under which scandals have given 
effects. 
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The two affairs 
 
2009 is likely to be remembered by most British parliamentarians as one of the most 
traumatic in their careers as politicians; for as the year of the great MPs’ expenses 
scandal, it saw hundreds of MPs publicly accused of having abused, for personal gain, the 
system for reimbursement of expenses incurred in the performance of their duties – 
leading to large numbers of resignations and dismissals; an unprecedented degree of 
public anger, and pressure for political reform going well beyond the issue of expenses 
itself. One of the most high-profile of the MPs involved, the former cabinet minister, 
Hazel Blears, explained her resignation from the Government by saying,  
 
I’d had four weeks of intense media pressure, the like of which I have never known, 
not just on me but on my husband, my dad, my family. At that point I’d had enough 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8097955.stm) 
 
Meanwhile another MP wrote on her political blog that the scandal had created such an 
unbearable atmosphere at Westminster that everyone there feared a suicide, and that 
many of her colleagues were ‘beginning to crack’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics 
/8063005.stm). 
 
What outraged the public about the revelations were really two things, first, the 
fact that Parliament had attempted to prevent disclosure despite the passage, in 2000, of 
the Freedom of Information Act which gives the public a general right of access to 
information held by public authorities. There are certain absolute and qualified 
exemptions under the Act with the right to appeal to an Information Commissioner where 
an applicant for information believes his or her request has been wrongly rejected. And in 
fact the scandal originated in October 2004 when the journalist, Heather Brooke, began to 
ask for details of MPs’ expenses and when refusals led to a series of appeals which in 
their turn led to the attempt – through a House of Commons motion debated in January 
2009 and then withdrawn under public pressure – to exempt MPs’ expenses from the 
scope of the Freedom of Information Act. In the meantime, a series of media exposés 
culminated in May with the publication by the Daily Telegraph of a leaked copy of all the 
expenses claims, which it revealed in instalments from 8 May over several weeks.  
 
 What scandalised the public in the second place is that MPs appeared to have 
taken advantage of a loose specification and application of the rules on expenses to profit 
financially. For example, the so-called Green Book parliamentary expenses rules allowed 
MPs to claim the costs of running a second home in recognition of the fact that they in 
effect have to live in two places: in their constituencies and somewhere in or near London 
to enable them to attend Parliament. This so-called ‘additional cost’ allowance enabled 
MPs to claim up to £24,006 per annum for things like the mortgage interest payments and 
the utility bills associated with a second home – but officials also allowed claims for 
furniture and refurbishments, electrical items and food, and it came to light that MPs 
were able repeatedly to switch the designation of their second homes, enabling them to 
claim for renovating and furnishing more than one property. MPs could use renovations 
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significantly to add to the value of a property and then sell it, or claim for a second home 
while in fact renting it out. They could also designate a property as their second home to 
the parliamentary fees office while designating it as their primary residence with the tax 
authorities in order thereby to avoid paying tax on any capital gain when they sold it. 
When submitting expense claims, MPs had to sign a declaration confirming that the 
expenses had been incurred exclusively and necessarily for the purposes of performing 
their duties as a Member of Parliament, but they did not have to provide receipts for 
anything under £250 and it seems that fees office staff were unwilling to challenge 
members who had declared that their expenses were legitimate. Consequently, a number 
of the revelations, when they were made, provided the material for stinging media satire, 
the claims of Tories Douglas Hogg (for clearing the moat at his manor) and Peter Viggers 
(for an ornamental duck house) being just two of the most memorable examples. 
 
 Thompson (2000: 13) defines ‘scandal’ as something that ‘refers to actions or 
events involving certain kinds of transgressions which become known to others and are 
sufficiently serious to elicit a public response’; and the MPs’ expenses row clearly fits the 
five criteria he draws from this definition. First, it clearly involved the transgression of 
norms or moral codes – in this case norms about value for money, the proper use of 
reimbursement systems and so forth. A second criterion of a scandal is that, while known 
about by others, or strongly believed to exist, the events in question involve an element of 
secrecy or concealment – and this too is certainly true of the MPs’ expenses case as we 
have seen. Third, there has to be a degree of public disapproval, and in the case of the 
expenses row it is enough cite the results of the Ipsos MORI poll carried out at the end of 
May (http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItem 
Id=2349): over a half said they would not vote for a sitting MP caught up in the scandal 
even if it meant voting against the party they would want to win the election. Fourth, 
scandals involve public speech acts that communicate disapproval to others (thereby 
making them partly constitutive of the scandal itself) so that they are typically bound up 
with ‘opprobrious discourse’ (Thompson, 2000: 20) articulated through the mass media 
of communications. This was an especially significant feature of the expenses affair; for 
it was the success of the media in keeping the issue alive by revelations extending over 
several weeks that fed politicians’ fear and uncertainty about whether they would be the 
next to be exposed, and for what, thereby creating the sense that an entire political class 
was on trial. Finally, scandals threaten the reputations of the individuals whose actions lie 
at the centre of them – and here again, it is enough to refer to the Ipsos MORI poll: 48 
percent felt that half or more of MPs were corrupt; over two thirds felt that half or more 
MPs used power for their own personal gain as compared to only a minority having 
believed this in 2006.  
 
 The Berlusconi case also very clearly fitted these same five criteria. It all began 
on 28 April when La Repubblica newspaper wrote that the prime minister had attended 
the 18th birthday party of Noemi Letizia, an aspiring showgirl, as a result of which his 
wife announced that she would seek a divorce. Later, it was revealed that public 
prosecutors in Bari had begun a corruption investigation into an entrepreneur – 
Giampaolo Tarantini – suspected of procuring high-class prostitutes to attend parties at 
Berlusconi’s mansion, Palazzo Grazioli, in Rome.  
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True, revelations about politicians’ purely private misdemeanours are rarely the 
cause of scandal in Italy; but the norms perceived as having been transgressed in this case 
went beyond the area of sex and the premier’s marriage and concerned at least three 
aspects, first, abuse of office of an informal kind in that Berlusconi’s wife’s 
announcement was accompanied by her denunciation, as ‘shamelessly tacky’, of his 
decision to field as candidates in the European elections a number of young women who, 
it seems, kept him company in his free time and whose careers he had assisted in the 
world of entertainment. He was also accused of abuse of office in a more formal sense 
when it was alleged that he had used ‘official government aircraft to fly private guests, 
including young actresses and a Neapolitan balladeer described as his personal 
“minstrel”, to his luxury villa in Sardinia’ (Daily Telegraph, 16 June, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/5552751/Silvio-Berlusconis-girls- 
gaffes-and-graft-appeal-to-Italian-voters.html). Second, the scandal involved allegations 
of lying. Shortly after the Noemi Letizia affair broke la Repubblica newspaper publicly 
put to him ten questions surrounding the affair which he answered first one way and then 
another. For example, asked when and how he got to know Noemi’s father, on 29 April 
he replied that the father was a long-standing Socialist party member he had known for 
years and who had been the chauffer of the former Socialist Prime Minister, Bettino 
Craxi. Later that day, after Craxi’s son asserted that his father’s chauffeur had been 
someone else, the Prime Minister’s office put out a statement simply denying that 
Berlusconi had ever suggested that Letizia had been Craxi’s driver. Third, in the case of 
the candidates issue, Berlusconi was charged with demeaning women by exploiting the 
physical appearances of females to gain political advantage and of cheapening the 
democratic process and the institutions of state: it seemed that for at least some of the 
young women, beyond being given a helping hand by Berlusconi, it was a matter of 
indifference whether they got on in the world of politics or entertainment and this 
sustained the impression that what was fundamentally at issue here was relationships of 
dubious propriety in exchange for public office. 
  
The second of Thompson’s criteria was clearly fulfilled by the evidence, of which 
the chauffer case described above was a part, of the prime minister’s willingness to be 
economical with the truth. That the affair was met with a degree of public disapproval 
was revealed by the results of a poll published in La Repubblica in May. 20 percent said 
that they now had a worse opinion of Berlusconi following the news related to his 
possible divorce (www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/italians_assess_berlusconi_after_ 
divorce_row/). Meanwhile, in July, after further revelations, those having confidence in 
Berlusconi fell below 50 percent for the first time, down seven percentage points from 
April (www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/berlusconi_falls_below_50_mark_in_italy/). As 
in the case of the expenses row, so too in this case the fourth criterion, ‘oprobrious 
discourse’ articulated through the mass media, was particularly salient in that a very 
public struggle took place between la Rpubblica and the prime minister, over the 
newspaper’s ten questions to which it loudly and repeatedly demanded responses – while 
Berlusconi accused the newspaper and its editor of conducting a smear campaign driven 
by envy and hatred and urged businesses to undertake an advertising boycott (in turn 
leading the newspaper’s sister publication, l’Espresso, to announce the possibility of 
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legal action over the remarks). Finally, the scandal clearly placed the prime minister’s 
reputation at stake. As he visibly struggled to defend himself against allegations of lying, 
and against the increasingly strident media satire that accompanied each new revelation, 
the general sense that he had lost control of events inevitably undermined his authority. 
The loss of authority was especially acutely felt in the international sphere where satire in 
the foreign press was especially damaging to the country’s prestige thanks to the specific 
context in which it took place. This was one in which, with France and Germany now 
having two very pro-US governments in office, Italy mattered less to the White House – 
while Berlusconi’s decision to sign a deal with Russia on the South Stream gas link in 
competition with an alternative, western-backed gas pipeline designed to ease 
dependence on Russian gas, had caused anger in Washington and Brussels. So in the 
weeks following the initial revelations all the signs were that the scandal was beginning 
to dent the loyalty of his followers – especially as ministers feared that the investigations 
surrounding Tarantini might widen and that allegations by Patrizia D’Addario, who 
claimed she was paid by Tarantini to attend parties at Berlusconi’s private residences and 
that she spent the night of the US election with him, might prove to be true.  
 
 
Their consequences 
 
For all these reasons, the potential consequences of the scandal were highly significant. 
Berlusconi’s party had been constantly the most-voted since the early 1990s. He had 
become one of the longest-serving major political leaders on the continent (Albertazzi 
and McDonnell, 2009: 102). Consequently he was, first, the centre around which 
essentially everything in Italian politics revolved. On the one hand, he was the fulcrum 
around which the centre right was built and whose unity depended almost entirely on his 
continued popularity. On the other hand, opposition to him was the only common 
denominator of the parties on the centre left – and thus the source of their weakness and 
division; for while the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, PD) had sought to expand 
towards the centre by shelving anti-Berlusconi rhetoric, this had deprived it still further of 
any clear identity leaving it vulnerable to the incursions of its allies to which many of its 
voters felt closer in any event (Diamanti, 2008). As Giuliano Urbani (2009), Culture 
Secretary in the 2001 government, pointed out at the beginning of the year: ‘to be on the 
centre right means to support Berlusconi, to be on the centre left means to oppose him’. 
Third, Berlusconi exercised unassailable power over his own party – essentially his own 
personal creation and without any factions to speak of. Largely as a consequence of these 
three factors, when he took office in 2008, he did so as the head of what looked like being 
the strongest government in Italy’s post-war history. But what this also meant was that 
were Berlusconi forced from office, then survival of his party, coalition and therefore 
government might become very uncertain indeed. 
 
 The potential consequences of the expenses scandal were likewise significant. 
Already, the unprecedented decline in turnout in 2001, with the merest of recoveries in 
2005, had led to widespread discussion of a perceived crisis of participation (at least in 
conventional politics) especially among the young with several research studies throwing 
light on the underlying attitudes and outlooks. ‘The Power Commssion reported that “the 
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level of alienation felt towards politicians, the main political parties and the key 
institutions of the political system is extremely high and widespread” in the population as 
a whole’ (Sloam, 2007: 549). Pattie et al. (2004: 44) wrote about ‘a very significant 
decline in public confidence in government…over the past forty years’. Sloam (2007) 
suggested that salient attitudes of the young were a lack of trust of politicians; a belief 
that there are no real ideological differences between the main parties; overwhelming 
feelings of powerlessness.  Clearly, the expectation had to be that if anything the 
expenses scandal was likely to reinforce such attitudes – with potential consequences of 
the kind that had been listed by the Power Commission (2006: 15): 
 the weakening of the mandate and legitimacy for elected governments – 
whichever party is in power – because of plummeting turnout; 
 the further weakening of political equality because whole sections of the 
community feel estranged from politics; 
 the weakening of effective dialogue between governed and governors; 
 the weakening of effective recruitment into politics; 
 the rise of undemocratic political forces; 
 the rise of a ‘quiet authoritarianism’ within government. 
  
 In the event, neither scandal had the potential consequences we have described (or 
at least has not apparently had such consequences thus far); but of the consequences they 
have had, those of the expenses scandal seem the most significant, despite what one 
might argue are the similar ‘dimensions’ of the two affairs. The expenses scandal was 
large thanks to the numbers involved, the Berlusconi scandal thanks to the status of the 
person at the centre of it. A crude measure of the scandals’ relative dimensions might be 
had by examining newspaper headlines: a perusal of the LexisNexis Professional on-line 
database – which contains full-text articles from UK national and local newspapers – 
throws up 331 Guardian articles having the expression ‘MPs’ expenses’ somewhere in 
them in the month of May. A perusal of la Repubblica’s on-line data base throws up 140 
articles that in the same month mentioned the Berlusconi scandal.  
 
 Despite this similarity, the consequences of the two affairs contrasted sharply in at 
least three ways. First, at the European elections held in the first week of June, the Popolo 
della Libertà (People of Freedom, PdL) took 35.3 percent of the vote as compared to 34.9 
percent obtained by its constituent parties in 2004. In the UK, by contrast, Labour took 
15.7 percent of the vote, as compared to 22.6 percent in 2004 – a fall in support whose 
size was magnified by the decline in turnout – from 37.6 to 34 percent. Thus, the number 
who actually voted for the party fell from 3,718,683 to 2,381,760, a loss of well over one 
third. Meanwhile, the Conservatives (obtaining 4,198,394 as compared to 4,397,090 in 
2004) and the Liberal Democrats (obtaining 2,080,613 as compared to 2,452,327 in 2004) 
also lost.  
 
 In the second place, the fall-out from the expenses row placed Gordon Brown’s 
role as party leader and therefore as prime minister under very serious pressure with an 
intensification of the calls upon him to resign that had begun to make themselves heard a 
year earlier as the Conservative opinion-poll lead, established at the end of 2007, moved 
into double figures. In Italy, by contrast, the controversy surrounding Berlusconi had 
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little or no impact either on his own ratings or those of his government: Figure 3.  
 
 Finally, the expenses row prompted a wide-ranging debate on reform of the 
political system that went well beyond the issue of expenses itself and led the Committee 
on Standards in Public Life to accelerate its investigation of the system for MPs’ 
reimbursements leading, in November, to detailed proposals for reform (while huge 
majorities agreed that ‘MPs named and shamed in the newspapers over their expense 
claims should be forced to stand down from parliament’, www.bbc.co.uk/blogs 
/dailypolitics/andrewneil/images/pollmay09.pdf). By contrast, the same period in Italy 
saw no similar reform proposals or pressure for proposals, but, rather, the opposite; for it 
was marked by a huge public row involving the Prime Minister, the President and all the 
major political parties, thanks to the Constitutional Court’s rejection of the lodo Alfano 
granting immunity from prosecution to the holders of the four highest offices of state, 
including the Prime Minister. Though the law was widely perceived as an ad personam 
initiative driven solely by Berlsuconi’s desire to use it to solve his own personal legal 
difficulties, more (44 percent) saw the Court’s decision as ‘a political attack on Silvio 
Berlusconi’ than viewed it as ‘a fair sentence on a bad provision’: 41 percent 
(www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/italians_split_on_decision_to _scrap_alfano_law/). 
   
 
Why the difference? 
 
We can begin to appreciate why two otherwise rather similar episodes could nevertheless 
have such contrasting impacts when we bear in mind that ‘scandals are struggles over 
symbolic power in which reputation and trust are at stake’ (Thompson, 2000: 245, italics 
in original). Since scandals involve allegations of wrong-doing of one kind or another, 
they necessarily throw a question mark over the trustworthiness of those involved in them 
and this threatens their reputations as persons of honesty and integrity. Reputation of this 
kind is a vital source of symbolic power – the capacity to produce outcomes through the 
production and transmission of symbolic forms (Thompson, 2000: 246) – since it enables 
those who possess it to achieve goals they would simply be unable to achieve without it: 
as Thompson (2000: 248), notes, a second-hand car dealer, for instance, finds that a 
reputation as a trustworthy trader is his or her most crucial asset. Reputations are time-
consuming and arduous to establish but very quick and easy to lose so that struggles over 
reputation, of the kind involved in scandals, can be expected to be intense. This means 
that the resources that can be mobilised on either side, in a scandal, come to be of crucial 
significance. 
  
 In the final analysis the decisive resource, in the case of a scandal, is the support 
of public opinion whose distribution and nature will be influenced by the other material 
and non-material resources at the disposal of the protagonists. Thus, it should not be 
assumed, when a public figure is accused of wrong-doing, that the outcome must 
necessarily be one of universal condemnation. Rather, the extent and the substance of this 
attitude are variables. They constitute the terrain over which symbolic power struggles 
take place because they are complex. For example, the attitude we take towards one 
accused of wrong-doing, and their alleged action, will depend, among other things, on 
 10 
our perception of the accuser; their motives in making the allegation, and how believable 
the allegations are. Our attitude will also depend on our perception of: the alleged wrong 
doer; their motives in acting the way they supposedly did; the extent to which they could 
have acted differently; the repercussions of their action, and so forth. From the point of 
view, then, of the distribution and content of public attitudes and of the extent to which 
these could be influenced by those at the centre of the two episodes we have described, 
the episodes themselves were very different.  
 
 In terms of the distribution of attitudes, the allegations surrounding Berlusconi 
certainly provoked widespread feelings of condemnation and were certainly accompanied 
by the public articulation of opprobrious discourse, but public opinion on the matter 
seems to have been much more divided than it was in the case of the expenses scandal. 
While condemnation of the MPs’ behaviour was more or less universal,1 with 75 percent 
believing that the present system of governing Britain needs a lot of improving according 
to the Ipsos MORI poll cited above, 66 percent of Italians were apparently unmoved by 
the revelations concerning Berlusconi, saying in May that their view of him had not 
changed following the news related to his possible divorce (www.angus-
reid.com/polls/view/italians_assess_berlusconi_after_divorce_row). 
 
 In looking to account for this difference, one’s thoughts are drawn to the content 
of attitudes and, therefore, to the fact that in the Berlusconi case but not in the case of the 
MPs, the affair had partisan implications. We know that individuals’ prior political 
predispositions act as filters and frames through which they process and perceive new 
information and that partly for this reason, the extent to which corruption scandals may 
cost votes, for example, is highly variable (Jiménez and Caínzos, 2006). So it was 
reasonable to suppose that in the Italian case, the electoral fall-out from the affair might 
be quite minimal – an expectation that is, moreover, reinforced by what we know, or 
think we know, about the more general attitudes of Berlusconi supporters. First, 
widespread diffidence towards public officials, scepticism of their impartiality, and 
therefore admiration for individuals able to gain advantage by ‘working the system’ 
render voters indifferent to Berlusconi’s conflicts of interest and to accusations that he 
abuses his public position for his private advantage: ‘He’s not stupid! And being rich 
already, he won’t steal from us’. Second, his success in selling himself as the authentic 
voice of the people, as the successful outsider who can right the wrongs supposedly 
visited on ordinary people by professional politicians, makes it possible, not to say likely, 
that his gaffes and faux pas are studied rather than chance occurrences, serving, as has the 
recent discussion of his alleged personal and sexual improprieties, to lend credibility to 
the populist message by conveying the idea that though endowed with extraordinary 
qualities, he is also human like the rest of us. Third, these attitudes have been heavily 
influenced by the entrepreneur’s repeated portrayal of himself, predating the scandal, as 
the victim of a witch hunt – whether on the part of partisan newspaper editors or left-
wing public prosecutors, determined to abuse their positions to discredit him and thereby 
                                                  
1 According to the BBC poll cited above, the proportion believing that MPs named and shamed over 
expenses should be forced to stand down was 64 percent. The fact that this was not higher probably says 
more about people’s willingness of forgive and their attitudes to punishment than it does about their 
condemnation of the behviour as such. 
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score a political victory that they have been unable to score, democratically, through the 
ballot box. In this way, Berlusconi manages to draw upon and to reinforce, widespread 
anti-political attitudes and thus successfully to defend himself thanks to the great paradox 
such attitudes embody. This is the paradox that having provided the basis for the great 
Tangentopoli scandal at the beginning of the 1990s, these same attitudes have made 
consequential reform well nigh impossible because they have provided the basis for an 
escalation of institutional tensions between judicial and political spheres which 
Berlusconi has been able to take advantage of by claiming that the various charges of 
corruption and false accounting that have been brought against him are the work of 
biased prosecutors driven by the desire to damage him for political reasons. Finally, 
supporters are relatively indifferent to allegations of impropriety against Berlsuconi 
because identifying with a personality like him enables them symbolically to share in the 
wealth and opulence he represents and to feel that in however small a way they too have 
been successful. 
 
 In all these respects, the expenses saga was a very different affair. Since MPs 
from all parties were involved, it had none of the partisan implications of the Berlusconi 
scandal so that, though it too was driven by widespread anti-political sentiments, MPs 
were quite unable to draw upon them to frame the accusations against them as part of a 
broader struggle between left and right. Consequently, in radical contrast to Berlusconi, 
they were the ‘victims’ of these attitudes, not their master. Nor, needless to say, could 
individual MPs draw upon anything like the resources available to Berlusconi – whether 
through his position as head of the executive or as a media magnate – to keep his 
reputation intact. Thus, though many MPs tried to defend themselves, they were never 
able to go on the offensive, and the impression was always the one created by Tory MP, 
Nadine Dorries, who, in a BBC interview, said, ‘MPs are all human beings and they do 
not deserve to be treated like this’ (BBC News Channel, 22 May 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8063005.stm). In other words, the impression was 
always that they were taking a last stand. 
 
 Finally, then, comparison of the two episodes suggests that the broader political 
culture and institutional contexts will be important in shaping the impact and outcome of 
a scandal. The anti-political sentiments that played such a central role in the unfolding of 
the two scandals are widespread in both countries; but in the one case they have led to 
detailed reform proposals and the likelihood that the increasingly in-depth specification 
of what is acceptable on the part of those in positions of public trust will continue. The 
reasons, we would suggest lie in the particular form that anti-political sentiments take in 
the UK. One can argue on the basis of available survey data2 that bluntly, the British are 
unreasonably strict in what they expect of public officials’ conduct. On the one hand 
people expect senior office holders to act as role models for them, exemplifying much 
higher standards than those they would tolerate in others – but then they show a level of 
cynicism about how the office holders actually behave that appears to be mainly a 
function of lack of familiarity with their work: as soon they are asked to reflect on groups 
‘closer to home’ (such as their local MPs as opposed to MPs in general), exaggeratedly 
negative perceptions disappear. In this context, reform proposals and legislative 
                                                  
2  Such as that gathered by the Standards Committee in 2003 and 2005: see Newell, 2008, for details. 
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initiatives have the appearance of attempts to assuage public opinion by measures 
designed to improve standards but of ever growing complexity. In Italy, by contrast, anti-
political sentiments express and are fuelled less by anger and demands that things must 
change, than they are by resignation and scepticism about the possibilities for change. 
Sustained by widespread negative views of the country’s institutions of government and 
their performance (ultimately deriving from the circumstances surrounding the creation 
of the Italian state in 1861) these outlooks foster the arte di arrangiarsi and the search for 
solutions of an individualistic rather than a collective kind. Consequently, major reform 
efforts are less frequently forthcoming. 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
It is an open question whether the British or the Italian outlooks are to be preferred. If 
Italy really is a polity in which public confidence in the effective and impartial operation 
of public institutions is perhaps lower than in some other western European countries, 
then it might also be true to say that awareness of the divergence between formal and 
actual rules, and the consequent willingness to regard law and its enforcement as 
something negotiable, betokens precisely the high degree of tolerance which Almond and 
Verba (1963) among others have claimed is so essential for healthy democratic living. 
Meanwhile, though such a state of affairs might also be potentially destructive of social 
capital, it might be that responding to scandal and attempting to deal with issues of trust 
by ever increasing regulation of the kind seen in Britain since the early 1990s is likewise 
destructive of it. A proliferation of rules and a narrowing of the boundaries of discretion 
discourage people from using their judgement and taking personal responsibility for their 
conduct; they may increase the likelihood of misconduct through a multiplication of the 
rules there to be broken, and the opportunities for the launching of vexatious complaints. 
All of this might then increase the likelihood of public outcry given the ‘increasing 
disengagement of the media in reporting on politics as an activity rather than focussing 
on scandals and personalities’ (Doig, 2004: 448). This, as the recent activities and reports 
of the Standards Committee suggest, might then give rise to demands that perceived gaps 
in the integrity system be plugged – resulting in further reform, and a further twist to the 
circle.3 
 
 However this may be, it is clear that we now have a research agenda. Our 
consideration of the MPs’ expenses and the Berlusconi scandals has suggested that the 
extent to which a political scandal has impacts of consequence for those touched by them 
and for the polity is likely to depend upon 
 the positions occupied by the ‘accused’ and the ‘accusers’; 
 their number; 
                                                  
3 For example, having persuaded Parliament, in the 1990s, to reform itself through acceptance of its 
recommendations for a code of conduct, a Commissioner and more detailed rules on the declaration of 
interests, the Committee on Standards has, on more than one occasion since, reviewed the reforms, each 
time proposing amendment. See, for example, its sixth report and its eighth report available through its web 
site, http://www.public-standards.gov.uk/ 
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 the nature of public attitudes towards the ‘accused’ and the ‘accuser(s)’ and 
towards the transgressions alleged to have taken place; 
 the distribution of such attitudes; 
 the resources available to ‘accused’ persons to defend their reputations by 
influencing public attitudes; 
 the characteristics of the broader political culture informing such attitudes.  
It now remains for further research to assess the relative importance of these variables by 
means of comparative research based on large-N studies.  
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Figure 1 Guardian headlines containing the roots 'corrupt' or 'bribe' or 'embezzle' or 'fraud' or 
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0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
400 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Year 
Number 
Figure 2 Headlines containing the roots 'corrupt' or 'bribe' or 'embezzle' or 'fraud' or 'sleaze' in The 
Age (Melbourne), The Jerusalem Post, the Irish Times 
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Figure 3 Confidence in Berlusconi and support for 
his coalition in 2009
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Ja
n
Ma
rch Ap
ril
Ma
y
Ju
ly
Se
pte
mb
er
Oc
tob
er
No
ve
mb
er
De
ce
mb
er
Month
P
er
ce
nt Berlusconi
Governing coalition
 
 
Source: Angus Reid Global Monitor: Silvio Berlusconi, http://www.angus-
reid.com/issue/C49/P0/ 
 
Note: ‘Berlusconi’ = percentage expressing confidence in Silvio Berlusconi; ‘Governing 
coalition’ = percentage naming one of the governing parties in response to the question, 
‘If the national political election were held today, which party would you vote for?’ 
